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Abstract
Background: Removing user fees in primary health care services is one of the most critical policy
issues being considered in Africa. User fees were introduced in many African countries during the
1980s and their impacts are well documented. Concerns regarding the negative impacts of user fees
have led to a recent shift in health financing debates in Africa. Kenya is one of the countries that
have implemented a user fees reduction policy. Like in many other settings, the new policy was
evaluated less that one year after implementation, the period when expected positive impacts are
likely to be highest. This early evaluation showed that the policy was widely implemented, that
levels of utilization increased and that it was popular among patients. Whether or not the positive
impacts of user fees removal policies are sustained has hardly been explored. We conducted this
study to document the extent to which primary health care facilities in Kenya continue to adhere
to a 'new' charging policy 3 years after its implementation.
Methods: Data were collected in two districts (Kwale and Makueni). Multiple methods of data
collection were applied including a cross-sectional survey (n = 184 households Kwale; 141
Makueni), Focus Group Discussions (n = 12) and patient exit interviews (n = 175 Kwale; 184
Makueni).
Results:  Approximately one third of the survey respondents could not correctly state the
recommended charges for dispensaries, while half did not know what the official charges for health
centres were. Adherence to the policy was poor in both districts, but facilities in Makueni were
more likely to adhere than those in Kwale. Only 4 facilities in Kwale adhered to the policy
compared to 10 in Makueni. Drug shortage, declining revenue, poor policy design and
implementation processes were the main reasons given for poor adherence to the policy.
Conclusion: We conclude that reducing user fees in primary health care in Kenya is a policy on
paper that is yet to be implemented fully. We recommend that caution be taken when deciding on
how to reduce or abolish user fees and that all potential consequences are carefully considered.
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Introduction
Removing user fees in primary health care services is one
of the most critical policy issues being considered in
Africa. User fees were introduced in many African coun-
tries during the 1980s as a response to the significant eco-
nomic constraints and increasing donor pressure.
Proponents of user fees argued that fees would generate
additional revenue, which could be used to improve
equity and efficiency; that graduated fees would encour-
age use of low cost primary health care services rather than
expensive referral facilities; and that they would improve
targeting of resources by reducing unnecessary demand
[1]. More than two decades since their introduction, evi-
dence shows that user fees have done more harm than
good. They impact negatively on the demand for health
care, contribute towards household poverty, promote
inequities and generate little revenue [2-9]. Waivers have
generally failed to protect the poor: deciding who should
benefit is difficult; patients have little knowledge of waiv-
ing mechanisms; and the process of acquiring a waiver is
complex and time consuming for both patients and pro-
viders [10].
Concerns regarding the consequences of user fees and
other Out-of Pocket payments (OOPs) have led to a recent
shift in health financing debates in Africa, away from user
fees to mechanisms that encourage prepayment and tax
funding [11]. Uganda and South Africa have already elim-
inated user fees in all primary health care facilities. Kenya
replaced variable user fees for primary health care with a
minimum flat rate, while Zambia has eliminated user fees
in all rural government facilities. Other countries includ-
ing Tanzania, Burundi and Burkina Faso are considering-
or are in the process of-user fees removal [12].
Recent experiences with user fees removal in Africa have
generally led to increased utilisation of health care serv-
ices. In Uganda, almost all health services immediately
reported a 50–100% increase in attendance, with about
50% of the increase being reported among adults in the
poorest quintile [13]. Similar patterns were reported in
South Africa, although the initial increases were not
always maintained over time, and increased utilisation of
curative services appeared to crowd out preventive care
and demoralised staff [14,15].
Initial increases in utilisation have in some cases been
used to justify fee removal. However, evaluations of user
fees removal have mainly been conducted within the first
year of policy implementation, the period when the
expected positive impacts are likely to be highest [13,16].
Immediate evaluation of user fees removal can overesti-
mate policy success and may fail to capture the experi-
ences of policy implementers in their attempts to adhere
to new policies. Whether or not increased utilisation rates
are sustained, the extent to which facilities continue to
adhere to 'new' policies, and the impact on service provi-
sion and quality of care have hardly been explored. We
conducted this study to document the extent to which pri-
mary health care facilities in Kenya continue to adhere to
a 'new' charging policy 3 years after its implementation.
We also gathered providers' opinions on the new policy,
communities' understanding of the recommended
charges under the new policy, and their perceived impact
on service quality.
An overview of health care financing in Kenya
Like many African countries, Kenya introduced user fees
in public health facilities in the 1980s, reflecting a combi-
nation of factors including poor economic performance,
inadequate financial resources, declining budget alloca-
tions and international donor pressure [6]. Following ini-
tial implementation in 1989, user fees were suspended in
1990 and reintroduced in 1991 [5,10]. Facilities set user
fees locally with the support of Health Facility Commit-
tees (HFCs). Fees were charged for individual services like
drugs, injections, and laboratory services. Revenue col-
lected was returned to the district level and facilities devel-
oped detailed plans for spending 75% of the revenue. A
waiving policy to protect the poor was put in place, and
children below five years were exempted from all charges,
but in reality waiving and exemption mechanisms hardly
existed [6].
Evidence on user fees and other OOPs in Kenya revealed
that health care charges were a significant barrier to access
especially among the poorest populations [5,10,17]. To
address these equity concerns and partly to fulfill a politi-
cal pledge, the Minister for Health announced that from
1st July 2004, services at dispensaries and health centres
would be free for all citizens, except for a minimum regis-
tration fee of Kenya Shillings (KES) 10 and KES 20 respec-
tively (approximately 2008 USD 0.2 and 0.3 respectively).
Under the new policy – commonly referred to as the 10/
20 policy – children aged below five years and specific
health conditions such as Malaria and Tuberculosis are
exempted from payment. Registration fees should also be
waived for the poor. In a further development, all fees for
deliveries in public health facilities were abolished in July
2007.
An evaluation of the 10/20 policy was conducted in 2005
[16]. Using data collected in 2004, the evaluation
reported high adherence to the new policy and an increase
in utilisation of 70%. This increase was not sustained,
although utilisation remained 30% higher than prior to
the 10/20 policy. The policy was also reported to be pop-
ular among patients, but not with health workers.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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Another related intervention was a pilot project intro-
duced in Coast province in late 2005 that provided funds
to compensate facilities for lost user fees revenue. Direct
Facility Funding (DFF) was supported by the Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA) and was
meant to enable facilities to adhere to the 10/20 policy.
Facilities receiving DFF were required to open a bank
account where funds were transferred directly from the
national level. Decisions on how to spend DFF funds were
made at the facility level, although facilities were expected
to comply with some guidelines. For example, a maxi-
mum of 30% of the individual facility funds could be
spent on allowances, but the funds could not be used to
purchase drugs or laboratory services. Drugs and equip-
ments are supplied by the Kenya Medical Suppliers
Agency (KEMSA). Plans are under way to scale up DFF
country wide, with the first round of funds likely to be
paid in 2009.
The 10/20 policy and DFF are potentially good develop-
ments for the Kenyan health sector. It is therefore impor-
tant to document the extent to which facilities in areas
with and without DFF continue to adhere to the 10/20
policy a few years after implementation, the contribution
of this policy towards improving access to health care, and
how both health workers and community members per-
ceive the policy.
Methods
Study area
Data were collected in two districts: Kwale in Coast prov-
ince and Makueni in Eastern province. The two districts
are semi-arid with high poverty levels. Agriculture is the
main source of income in both districts, although Kwale
has a significant tourism sector. The districts were chosen
purposively from a wider study conducted in four districts
in Kenya. The aim of the wider study was to explore barri-
ers of access to malaria control interventions among the
poorest population. Reducing user fees for primary health
care and providing free malaria treatment in all govern-
ment facilities in Kenya were some of the interventions
considered in the study as having the potential to promote
access to health care among the poor, particularly because
malaria is the major cause of mortality and morbidity in
both districts. Kwale district was selected because it is
located in Coast province where the DFF was being
piloted, while Makueni was chosen because there was no
DFF in the district thus acting as a 'control' site, and it was
the closest to Kwale of the remaining three districts. Both
districts were also the closest to the researchers' institu-
tional base.
Data collection and analysis
Data collection took place in May and June 2007. Both
qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were
applied including interviews with health workers and
HFC members, exit interviews with patients, Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs) and a cross-sectional survey. A multi-
stage sampling approach was conducted to select survey
households for the wider study. The same households
responded to questions regarding user fees reduction:
￿ First, locations (the 2nd lowest administrative unit in
Kenya) were selected using poverty indicator maps
[18]. The maps classified locations within each district
into poverty quintiles based on the percentage of the
population living below the international poverty line
of USD 1 per day. We identified all locations which
fell within the two poorest quintiles in each district.
We assumed that by focusing on the two poorest quin-
tiles we stood a high chance of reaching the poorest
households that are expected to have poor access to
health care.
￿ The locations in the two poorest quintiles contained
a total of 73 Enumeration Areas (EAs) (28 Kwale; 45
Makueni). We randomly selected 4 EAs per district.
￿ We updated the homestead list and randomly
selected 100 homesteads per district from participat-
ing EAs.
￿ All households in the homestead were included in
the study (n = 184 Kwale; 141 Makueni).
Key information gathered through the household survey
included community members' understanding of recom-
mended charging levels at the dispensaries and health
centres, their understanding of waivers and exemptions
and their experiences in securing waivers.
For the facility-level data collection, we selected 14 health
facilities in Kwale (10 dispensaries and 4 health centres)
and 20 facilities in Makueni (13 dispensaries and 7 health
centres). These facilities were sampled purposively
because they were located close to the areas where the
household survey took place and were therefore likely to
serve the community under study. Semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with facility in-charges to enable a
detailed inquiry into the factors surrounding policy
change and service provision. Key questions covered in
the semi-structured interviews were: charging levels for
adults, under fives and specific illness conditions; whether
or not they adhered to the policy and factors facilitating/
hindering adherence; processes for granting waivers; and
perceptions on 10/20 policy and it impacts on service pro-
vision.
Exit interviews were conducted with patients (or guardi-
ans in the case of children) seeking treatment on the dateInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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of the interview (n = 175 Kwale; 184 Makueni). All partic-
ipants attending the facility between 8.30 am to 1.00 pm
on the date of interview were approached to take part in
the study. Only 8 people declined. Exit interviews cap-
tured data on the type of services received, amount paid
and perceptions of quality of care. These data were supple-
mented by 12 FGDs, selected on the basis of gender and
place of residence.
Quantitative data were double entered into Fox-Pro ver-
sion 9.0 and later transferred to STATA (9.0) for analysis.
Data from the FGDs were tape-recorded, transcribed and
typed into Ms-Word, while notes were taken for semi-
structured interviews. Qualitative data were analyzed
manually using content analysis to identify common
themes and sub-themes. Key themes were organised
around the main topics of interest, for example, charging
levels and charging strategies, adherence to the policy,
impacts of policy on service provision (positive and nega-
tive) and community understanding of the policy.
Results
Description of study participants and health facilities
Dispensary in-charges were mainly nurses while all health
centres were headed by a clinical officer (Table 1). Most of
the in-charges had worked at the participating health facil-
ity for more than three years. The median number of
health workers per facility was 2 (range = 1–24). The range
of services provided differed across facilities, with some
offering laboratory services (n = 5 Kwale; 11 Makueni),
inpatient care (n = 2 Kwale; 11 Makueni) and delivery
services (n = 6 Kwale; 19 Makueni). Exit interview partici-
pants had mainly visited the facility for curative services
(81% Kwale; 61% Makueni) and immunisations for chil-
dren below five years (12% Kwale; 21% Makueni). Partic-
ipants from Makueni were generally better educated than
those from Kwale. Only 42.9% of the respondents had
some years of formal education in Kwale compared to
80.0% in Makueni. Household survey respondents were
mainly household heads (59.2% Kwale; 50.4% Makueni)
or their spouses (33.7% Kwale; 39.0% Makueni).
Communities' understanding of recommended charges
Communities had very limited understanding of the rec-
ommended charges under the 10/20 policy. About a third
of all household survey respondents (regardless of
whether they visited dispensaries and health centres)
could not correctly state the recommended charges for
dispensaries, while half reported that they did not know
the official charges for health centres (Table 2). Only
26.1% of respondents in Kwale and 41.1% in Makueni
reported that children under five should be exempted
from payments, while a further 25.0% in Kwale and 7.1%
in Makueni reported that the poor are eligible for free
treatment (Table 3).
Results from FGDs supported the household survey find-
ings. Charging levels were said to differ between facilities,
with most charging higher than the recommended fees.
There was confusion regarding the existing charging levels
however, with people from the same community report-
ing different levels at their local facility. People reported
being charged for various items including drugs, injec-
tions and cards:
"For children the charges are KES 10 for tablets and KES 20
for each injection. Adults pay KES 10 for registration. The other
Table 1: Basic characteristics of health workers and description of services offered at participating facilities
Kwale Makueni
Dispensaries
(n = 10)
Health centres (n = 4) Dispensaries (n = 13) Health Centres (n = 7)
In charges
• Clinical officers 1 4 0 7
• Nurses 9 0 13 0
• Public Health Officers 0 0 0 0
All staffs
• Clinical officers 2 8 0 8
• Nurses 18 19 23 37
• Public Health officers 9 3 0 12
Services
• Laboratory 2 3 4 7
• Inpatient 0 2 0 6
• Deliveries 3 3 12 7
• Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) 0 2 0 2International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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payment depends on the illness and could range from KES 150
to KES 250." (FGD, Women)
On a few occasions, participants demonstrated some
awareness of what the recommended charges were, but it
was not always clear what the charges were for. They high-
lighted the need for clarity and communication from the
authorities regarding charging levels:
"You pay KES 20 for the card then you are told to pay for drugs.
If you need an injection you are told to pay another KES
50...you see I get confused. Did the government not say that we
should only pay for the card [meaning registration]?" (FGD,
Men)
"There are some things that should be paid for and there are
others that do not require payment [under the 10/20]. But you
find that where money is required, you are asked to pay and
where payment is not required, you are also asked to pay. Now
the government needs to tell us what we should pay for and
what is provided for free." (FGD, Women)
How much are facilities charging?
Facility-level data showed that reported levels of charges
differed between and within districts, with very few facili-
ties reporting strict adherence to the 10/20 policy. Adher-
ence to the 10/20 policy in this paper refers to a situation
where dispensaries and health centers charged registration
fees of KES 10 and KES 20 respectively, with children
under the age of five and some illness conditions (e.g.
malaria and tuberculosis) being exempted from paying
the registration fees. Any extra charges (e.g. laboratory
fees, cards, drugs, delivery) indicate non-adherence to the
policy. Facilities were classified as adherent/non-adherent
to the policy based on reports on these charges from
health workers interviews. The findings presented there-
fore indicate levels of reported adherence, which might be
different from verified adherence.
Facilities in Makueni were more likely to adhere to the 10/
20 policy than those in Kwale. Only 4 facilities in Kwale
adhered to the policy compared to 10 in Makueni. Facili-
ties charged for different kinds of services including: regis-
tration, injections, drugs, deliveries and laboratory
services. Patterns of non-adherence differed between dis-
tricts. For example, all facilities that did not comply with
the 10/20 in Kwale charged registration fees to under fives
(n = 10), while 4 dispensaries increased the registration
fees from KES 10 to KES 20 and 3 health centres from KES
20 to KES 40. In contrast, only two facilities in Makueni
Table 2: Respondents' perceptions of government guidelines on user fees for all households that participated in the cross-sectional 
survey
Dispensaries Health Centres
Amount Kwale
n = 184 (%)
Makueni
n = 141 (%)
Kwale
n = 184 (%)
Makueni
n = 141 (%)
KES 10 55 (28.9) 25 (17.7) 1 (0.5) 2 91.4)
KES 20 25 (13.6) 36 (25.5) 13 (7.1) 20 (14.2)
KES 50 4 (2.2) 4 (2.8) 25 (13.6) 9 (6.4)
Depends on drugs 51 (27.7) 33 (23.4) 57 (30.1) 46 (32.6)
Do not know 39 (21.2) 39 (27.7) 87 (47.3) 61 (43.3)
Other 10 (5.4) 4 (2.8) 1 90.5) 3 (2.1)
Table 3: Household survey respondents' perceptions of 
government guidelines on groups who should receive free 
treatment (% in brackets)
Kwale
n = 184 (%)
Makueni
n = 141 (%)
Under 5s 48 (26.1) 58 (41.1)
The poor 46 (25.0) 10 (7.1)
Elderly 17 (9.2) 1 (0.7)
Pregnant women 11 (6.0) 5 (3.5)
Do not know 95 (51.6) 73 (51.8)
Other 4 (2.2) 2 (1.4)
*Total adds up to >100% because some respondents reported more 
than one category (N = 37 Kwale; 8 Makueni)International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
Page 6 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
charged registration fees to children under five and none
reported increasing the registration fees.
Results from exit interviews supported findings from
health worker interviews. About 57% of exit interview
participants in Kwale and 20% in Makueni who reported
being charged for treatment on the date of the interview
paid more than the recommended charges under the 10/
20 policy. Median levels in Makueni reflected the recom-
mended charges under the 10/20 policy, while median
charges in Kwale were double the official amount (Table
4).
Factors influencing adherence to the 10/20 policy
Drug shortage was the most common reason given for
poor adherence to the policy. Drug shortages were com-
mon during the peak illness seasons and towards the end
of the drug supply period (i.e. at the end of every quarter
before facilities received their quarterly supply). A review
of the drugs in stock indicated that most facilities in Kwale
(n = 10) and 2 in Makueni lacked at least one essential
drug on the date of the interview. To cope with drug short-
ages, facilities either increased the registration fees or
decided to charge extra fees for the drugs:
"The dispensary committee decided to increase the charges
because the facility often experiences drug shortages. They buy
drugs and sell them to the patients at KES 50 for each type of
drug." (Interview, facility in-charge, Makueni)
In some cases, concerns were not about an overall lack of
drugs, but a failure to ensure that the content of the drug
kits suited local needs. For example, it was reported that
typhoid was a common health problem in Kwale but the
government drug kit did not contain typhoid drugs. Con-
sequently facilities purchased drugs that were not pro-
vided by the government and issued them to patients at an
extra fee.
Declining revenue also prevented facilities from adhering
to the 10/20 policy. It was reported that the recom-
mended registration fees were too low, were often insuffi-
cient to meet the running costs of the facility, and that
budgetary allocations from the government were inade-
quate. Adjusting fees was reported as an important coping
strategy to ensure that service provision was maintained:
"They increased registration fees to KES 20 per person includ-
ing children following discussions with the community because
it became impossible to continue providing services under the
10/20 policy." (Interview, facility in-charge, Kwale)
"They always experience cash shortages because what the facil-
ity budgets for is not what they receive from the government.
With the new charges [10/20], utilisation of services is high
and available drugs can not meet the high demand...so they
cope by increasing the charges" (Interview, facility in-charge,
Kwale)
Other reasons given were to raise funds to pay support
staff and to meet the costs of laboratory services which
mainly operated on a private basis.
Dispensaries were more likely to adhere to the 10/20 pol-
icy than health centres. Out of the health centres included
in the study only one charged the recommended fees. The
main reason health centres failed to comply is that they
offered a wide range of services including inpatient care.
Some health centres were large and had structures similar
to sub-district hospitals but were still required to operate
under the 10/20 policy:
"The facility is classified as a health centre but it does not fit
this description because they offer inpatient services. The gov-
ernment gives them the same amount of money like other
health centres. They can not charge the recommended KES 20
because it is not enough to meet the costs of inpatient services.
They would have to close the wards..." (Interview, facility in-
charge, Kwale)
Concerns about the policy design were raised. Health
workers noted that while they wanted to adhere to the 10/
20 policy, some elements of the policy were not clear. The
exemption criteria were not well understood and in some
cases health workers unknowingly charged registration
fees for illness conditions and services that ought to be
provided for free, as demonstrated by this inaccurate view
put forward by one in-charge:
"Before the 10/20 patients with tuberculosis and women
attending ante-natal care were not supposed to pay, but with
the introduction of the 10/20, everyone has to pay for registra-
tion regardless of the type of illness or service received" (Inter-
view, facility in-charge, Makueni)
Table 4: Mean and median charges for exit interview participants 
who reported paying money for treatment/services on the date 
of interview
Dispensaries Health Centres
Amount Kwale
n = 98
Makueni
n = 73
Kwale
n = 14
Makueni
n = 32
Mean 25 14 52.3 36
Median 20 10 40 20
Range 100–220 10–100 20–230 20–100International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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The practicality of exempting malaria patients from pay-
ing the registration fees was also highlighted. Health
workers reported that many illness conditions have symp-
toms similar to malaria, and in the absence of laboratory
tests, it is difficult to confirm whether a patient is suffering
from malaria. Moreover, the registration fee is paid before
the patient is attended to by a health worker, making it
impossible for the health worker to exempt the patient
from payment should they be diagnosed with malaria:
"The facility still charges registration fees even for malaria
patients because it is difficult to differentiate who is suffering
from malaria and who is not." (Interview, facility in-charge,
Makueni)
Of concern also was = that malaria is reported as the main
illness condition in the districts and exempting all malaria
patients from paying the registration fees would lead to
little or no revenue:
"If it is free [malaria treatment] most people will come to the
facility suffering from malaria, all of them will be treated for
free and the facility will not raise any money." (Interview, facil-
ity in-charge, Kwale)
Lack of clarity partly made health workers-with the sup-
port of HFC adjust the fee levels to suit local needs. Even
at the district level, the policy was not well understood
and it was not always clear what power district officials
have over adjusting the official charges. For example, one
of the District Medical Officers for Health (DMOH)
endorsed new charges formulated by facilities and intro-
duced new district level policies, outlining the maximum
acceptable charges for the district.
Health worker and community perceptions of the 10/20 
policy
Health workers and community members reported that
the 10/20 policy was a good initiative with the potential
to promote access to health care services for all. However,
they expressed concerns that limited the potential of the
policy to achieve its objectives. For community members,
the main concerns regarding the 10/20 policy were low
quality of care, drug shortages and long queues:
"Treatment is much cheaper now [post 10/20]. Previously it
used to range from KES 200–300 but now we only pay KES 10.
But when treatment was expensive [pre-10/20] one would get
cured very quickly but now the drugs may not even work...in the
past the dispensary had very good drugs... now the treatment is
cheap but the drugs do not work [implying they do not always
get the appropriate drugs as confirmed by reports from health
workers]. So you pay KES 10 and the illness does not go away.
It is better to pay more and get cured." (FGD, Men)
Others felt that the drug shortages were not due to the 10/
20 policy, but a much deeper problem associated with
service provision and staffs remuneration:
"The other day I was told to buy certain drugs for my brother. I
set off to go to the chemist but the doctor called me and asked
me to give him the money so that he could buy the drugs for me
at a cheaper price. Within a few minutes he had bought the
drugs....so I wondered whether there was actually a drug short-
age or someone is making money out of it." (FGD, men)
"The truth is, the government provides free drugs...but there are
a lot of patients and a lot of work and the staffs are poorly paid.
So they are forced to sell the drugs to get some money." (FGD,
Women)
Health workers expressed similar concerns. Availability of
revenue from cost sharing enabled facilities to not only
purchase drugs but to also ensure that the kind of drugs
available suited local health needs:
"During cost sharing, we had good money to run the facility.
We had more drugs because we could buy them. We do not do
that any more." (Interview, facility in-charge, Makueni)
Concerns were expressed regarding paying the registration
fees and not receiving the prescribed drugs from the facil-
ity, with people suggesting that the registration fees
should only be paid once the drugs have been received or
confirmed to be available from the facility pharmacy:
"Ideally we should not be asked to pay for the prescription book
[meaning registration fees]...we should only pay when we
receive the actual treatment [meaning drugs]" (FGD, Women)
Discussion
Adherence to the 10/20 policy was poor in both districts,
although facilities in Makueni were more likely to adhere
to the policy than those in Kwale. Half the facilities in
Makueni and nearly three-quarters in Kwale did not
adhere to the 10/20 policy. Of concern was that most
facilities in Kwale did not exempt children under five from
paying the registration fees. Facility in-charges were aware
that under-fives should be exempted from payment but
continued to charge them in order to generate additional
revenue. An initial evaluation of the 10/20 policy noted
that under-fives were exempted from paying the registra-
tion fees in almost all facilities [16]. Our findings indicate
otherwise, highlighting the limitations of evaluating a
policy soon after implementation and the need to moni-
tor adherence over time.
A major factor limiting adherence to the 10/20 policy was
drug shortages. Health workers expressed frustrations of
not being able to provide patients with appropriate drugs.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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Drug availability is a major factor influencing health seek-
ing behaviour [19-21]. Severe drug shortages following
user fees removal have been reported in other settings
[15,22]. In Uganda, where user fees removal was accom-
panied by other reforms to address the expected increase
in utilisation, shortage of drugs and other medical sup-
plies was minimal [23], although information on whether
this was sustained is lacking. Reducing user fees may do
little to improve access to health care if adequate drug sup-
plies are not maintained and if drug supply does not relate
to local health needs [24]. Of concern is that facilities in
Kwale reported experiencing regular drug shortages more
than in Makueni, despite a new drug supply system (a pull
system where facilities order their drugs rather than receiv-
ing standard drug kits) being piloted in the district at the
time of the study. While we support the move to involve
health workers in deciding the contents of the drug kit, we
recommend that the pilot system in Kwale be evaluated
before a national roll out is implemented to ensure that
the benefits of a pull drug supply system are achieved.
One of the main reasons behind the suspension of user
fees in Kenya in 1990 was because the concept of charging
registration fees was not popular among service users
[5,10]. Concerns regarding paying registration fees were
also expressed in our study. Whether to charge consulta-
tion rather than drug fees remains a critical issue that can
undermine trust in the health system in the context of reg-
ular drug shortages. The Kenyan health sector should care-
fully consider whether a flat consultation fee is more
appropriate than a flat drug fee to improve access to
health care services.
One of the arguments used to support user fees removal
in international debates is that they generate very little
revenue – usually less than 5% of total operating costs in
most countries – and thus removing them will have little
impact on revenue and operation of facilities [9,24]. Our
findings indicate that although this revenue is low, it
serves an important role in ensuring that facilities meet
the costs of services and salaries for support staff that are
not funded through the government's budget. Various
authors highlight the need for government and donors to
compensate facilities for lost revenue and for additional
resources required to cope with utilisation increases
[12,23,24]. In Uganda, where user fees removal was suc-
cessful – at least in the first year of implementation – the
health sector budget was increased by 22 percent to cater
for lost revenue, expected drug shortages and increased
utilisation. The main aim of the DFF in Kenya was to com-
pensate facilities for lost revenue. However our findings
indicate that the DFF did not necessarily lead to improved
adherence to the 10/20, with lower adherence found in
Makueni, the district with DFF. While health workers
acknowledged that the DFF was important in many ways,
they expressed concerns about rigid budget lines that did
not allow them to reallocate funds between line items,
and the fact that the funds could not be used to purchase
drugs despite drug shortage being a major problem.
Whether fee levels would have been higher in Kwale in the
absence of the DFF and whether funds provided under the
DFF were adequate to fill the gap in revenue remains
unclear. A more detailed assessment of the DFF and why
facilities in Kwale may have failed to adhere to the 10/20
policy despite the additional funds is necessary before the
nation wide scale up.
Poor policy design, a poor implementation process and
staff attitudes towards policy change were major factors
that hindered facilities from adhering to the 10/20 policy.
Health workers felt that it was practically impossible to
implement some elements of the policy and that the
exemption criteria were not clear. Consequently, they
altered the contents of the policy to suit their settings.
Challenges around clarity of the policy content existed in
all levels, including the district headquarters. Whether
health workers have authority to alter the contents of the
10/20 policy to suit the needs of specific health facilities
remains unclear.
Other studies have shown that policy implementers re-
design their own policies, influencing the content and
impacts of policies particularly in situations where a top-
down approach to implementation is adopted [22,25,26].
These authors argue that policy implementers interpret
and adopt policy changes in ways that shape policy, lead-
ing to unexpected outcomes. Policies may have good
intentions, but translating them into practice and ensur-
ing that the intended benefits are achieved can be a chal-
lenge [9]. The 10/20 policy demonstrates how the success
of a well intended policy can be weakened by poor policy
design and implementation. We call for a reduction in the
gap between policy makers and implementers by adopt-
ing bottom-up approaches to implementation that ensure
health workers, facility committees and District Health
Management Teams are engaged throughout the policy
process.
Affordability of health care services was reported to be bet-
ter post the 10/20 policy. However, health workers and
community members had reservations regarding the per-
ceived quality of care and the potential of the policy to
improve access to health care. An initial evaluation of the
10/20 policy indicated that it was popular among patients
but not among health workers [16], while our findings
indicate that the policy was not popular in either group.
Of major concern to the health workers was the high
workload, arising from increased utilisation, which
exerted pressure on their ability to provide quality serv-
ices. An initial assessment of the impact of the 10/20 pol-International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/15
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icy reported a dramatic increase in utilisation in the first
six months after implementation [16,24]. While increased
utilisation may indicate a positive impact of the 10/20
policy, our data suggest that higher utilisation following
fees removal should be interpreted with caution. People
visited the facility more than once for treatment of the
same illness, perhaps because they did not receive appro-
priate drugs for their condition due to drug shortages.
Similar experiences were reported in Madagascar, where
utilisation patterns increased following fees removal in
1997/98, but a closer examination of the data revealed
that part of the reason for the increase was that many
patients were returning for treatment of the same illness
due to lack of appropriate drugs or supplies [27].
Limitations of the study
This study aimed to provide an overview of adherence to
the 10/20 policy, 3 years after implementation. A limita-
tion is that it was conducted in only two districts in Kenya
and with a small number of facilities purposively located
in the poorest parts of the districts. While focusing on a
small number of facilities enabled us to collect in-depth
information, we recognize the limitations of generalising
these findings to other parts of the country. A wide scale
evaluation of adherence to the policy that is generalisable
to the whole population is necessary. Understanding the
impacts of fees removal would have been stronger were
data on community and health worker perceptions pre
and post 10/20 available. In addition, some of the con-
cerns raised by participants cannot entirely be linked to
the10/20 policy, because the public health system suffers
from many weaknesses that are beyond the scope of this
paper. It is also worth noting that health workers might
have lost personal benefits with the introduction of 10/20
(e.g. allowances and salary supplements), which they
would have been unwilling to discuss, but which might
have influenced their perceptions on the policy. Finally,
the results presented are based on people's perceptions
which are difficult to verify, hence the findings should be
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless important lessons
regarding policy implementation and what happens on
the ground a few years after implementation can be drawn
from the findings.
Conclusion
In most facilities the 10/20 policy is not being put into
practice despite its valuable objectives. We conclude that
reduction of user fees in primary health care in Kenya is a
policy on paper that is yet to be implemented fully. The
findings demonstrate how removing or reducing user fees,
though well intended, can have negative implications for
service delivery. We join other authors who have called for
careful planning before user fees are removed [12,23,24].
We recommend that caution be taken when deciding on
how to reduce or abolish user fees and that all potential
consequences are considered. Measures to ensure effective
implementation of fees reduction or abolition should be
put in place through: (1) ensuring that policy guidelines
are clearly defined; (2) engaging health workers in the
policy design process; (3) providing timely information to
health workers, District Health Management Teams
(DHMTs) and HFCs; (4) promoting awareness of the pol-
icy to community members; (5) providing alternative
funds to compensate facilities for lost revenue and to cope
with utilisation increases; and (6) monitoring adherence
to the policy through for example mystery shoppers and
community interviews.
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